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  Labor's	  Military-­‐Industrial	  Complex	  	  Edmund	  F.	  Wehrle	  	  
Abstract	  	  Between	  the	  late	  1940s	  and	  mid-­‐1960s,	  American	  organized	  labor	  emerged	  among	  the	  most	  enthusiastic	  supporters	  of	  the	  military-­‐industrial	  complex.	  This	  study	  examines	  that	  emerging	  relationship,	  focusing	  on	  the	  efforts	  of	  a	  group	  of	  unionists	  to	  mold	  defense	  spending	  into	  a	  vehicle	  for	  promoting	  employment	  and	  addressing	  social	  and	  economic	  problems.	  	  During	  the	  Korean	  War,	  labor	  representatives	  drafted,	  lobbied	  for,	  and	  helped	  administration	  Defense	  Manpower	  Policy	  #4,	  a	  policy	  channeling	  defense	  spending	  to	  areas	  suffering	  high	  rates	  of	  unemployment.	  With	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration,	  preferential	  policies	  fell	  by	  the	  wayside,	  but	  organized	  labor	  continued	  to	  press,	  with	  some	  success	  for	  defense	  spending	  as	  a	  general	  antidote	  to	  economic	  downturns.	  Late	  in	  the	  1950s,	  the	  Construction	  Trades	  Department	  of	  Congress	  of	  Industrial	  Organizations	  and	  the	  American	  Federation	  of	  Labor	  (AFL-­‐CIO),	  reacting	  to	  double-­‐digit	  unemployment	  in	  their	  ranks,	  became	  an	  active	  promoter	  of	  fallout	  shelter	  construction.	  	  Despite	  some	  initial	  success	  in	  reimplementing	  preferential	  policies	  during	  the	  early	  months	  of	  the	  Kennedy	  administration,	  organized	  labor's	  defense	  agenda	  quickly	  ran	  afoul	  of	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Robert	  S.	  McNamara's	  plans	  to	  systematize	  and	  rationalize	  the	  defense	  sector.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  resistance	  from	  military	  and	  business	  leaders	  greatly	  impeded	  labor's	  progress.	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  however,	  labor's	  defense	  agenda	  reflects	  a	  larger	  social	  vision	  and	  also	  suggests	  the	  very	  real	  attraction	  to	  many	  unionists	  of	  the	  military-­‐industrial	  complex,	  a	  malleable	  economic	  realm,	  open	  to	  political	  influence	  and	  somewhat	  removed	  from	  the	  harsh	  forces	  of	  the	  market.	  	  To	  its	  legions	  of	  critics,	  the	  military-­‐industrial	  complex	  represents	  little	  more	  than	  a	  tragically	  inefficient	  expressway	  to	  militarism.	  During	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  revisionists	  such	  as	  Sidney	  Lens,	  Richard	  Kaufman,	  and	  Seymour	  Melman	  produced	  volumes	  reinforcing	  this	  point.1	  Today,	  scholars	  such	  as	  Andrew	  Bacevich	  and	  Chambers	  Johnson	  have	  updated	  and	  lent	  new	  sophistication	  to	  the	  revisionist	  argument.2	  But	  alongside	  their	  contributions,	  a	  postrevisionist	  perspective	  has	  emerged.	  Aaron	  Friedberg's	  study	  of	  early	  Cold	  War	  years	  posits	  that	  anti-­‐statism	  and	  fear	  of	  a	  "garrison	  state"	  fundamentally	  shaped	  the	  early	  military-­‐industrial	  complex,	  curbing	  its	  most	  dangerous	  undemocratic	  features.3	  Michael	  Hogan's	  work	  on	  the	  same	  period	  treats	  the	  military-­‐industrial	  complex	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
corporatism—as	  an	  outgrowth	  of	  a	  New	  Deal	  mindset	  that	  prized	  power	  sharing—again	  offering	  an	  important	  hedge	  against	  militarism.4	  	  Labor	  historians	  examining	  the	  postwar	  period	  tend	  to	  side	  with	  the	  revisionists.	  Organized	  labor's	  association	  with	  the	  military-­‐	  industrial	  complex,	  most	  labor	  historians	  have	  argued,	  represents	  a	  dangerous	  capitulation	  to	  the	  sinews	  of	  power.	  "[T]he	  independence	  and	  shop-­‐floor	  power	  .	  .	  .	  won	  in	  the	  1930s,"	  argued	  labor	  historian	  Nelson	  Lichtenstein,	  was	  compromised	  by	  the	  military	  mobilization	  of	  World	  War	  II	  which	  "ultimately	  strengthened	  corporate	  hegemony."5	  Organized	  labor's	  subsequent	  embrace	  of	  the	  military-­‐industrial	  complex	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Lichtenstein	  argues,	  further	  weakened	  its	  potential	  to	  serve	  its	  membership	  and	  pursue	  social	  justice.	  "By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,"	  concludes	  Seth	  Wigderson,	  "anticommunist	  union	  leaders	  had	  been	  politically	  marginalized	  and	  left	  with	  only	  a	  junior	  seat	  at	  the	  table	  of	  national	  politics."6	  	  This	  brief	  study	  seeks	  to	  situate	  organized	  labor's	  influence	  on	  the	  military-­‐industrial	  complex	  in	  a	  post-­‐revisionist	  perspective.	  Far	  [End	  Page	  97]	  from	  enjoying	  the	  free	  hand	  and	  limitless	  potential	  in	  the	  1930s	  some	  have	  seen,	  organized	  labor's	  gains	  in	  the	  1930s	  remained	  tentative	  and	  transitory.	  As	  the	  political	  climate	  grew	  ever	  more	  hostile	  after	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  mainstream	  of	  organized	  labor	  did	  embrace	  the	  military-­‐industrial	  complex	  for	  the	  jobs	  it	  provided	  and	  for	  the	  influence	  that	  labor	  might	  wield	  in	  the	  semipublic	  defense	  sector	  economy.	  Labor	  achieved	  most	  from	  the	  general	  "pump	  priming"	  military	  spending	  provide	  the	  economy.	  Still,	  behind	  the	  scenes,	  playing	  on	  its	  place	  in	  the	  liberal	  corporate	  coalition,	  organized	  labor	  fought	  to	  direct	  defense	  spending	  to	  its	  own	  purposes:	  promoting	  employment,	  especially	  in	  weak	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy.	  Labor's	  achievements	  were	  limited,	  but	  that	  initiatives	  could	  be	  mounted	  at	  all,	  reveals	  nuances	  not	  normally	  associated	  with	  the	  military-­‐	  industrial	  complex.	  Indeed,	  operating	  somewhat	  apart	  from	  the	  free	  market,	  the	  military-­‐industrial	  economy	  offered	  a	  venue	  for	  addressing	  social	  and	  economic	  problems—potential	  organized	  labor	  recognized	  and	  hoped	  to	  harness.	  	  This	  study	  in	  no	  way	  offers	  a	  comprehensive	  examination	  of	  labor's	  relationship	  with	  the	  military-­‐industrial	  complex.	  Rather	  by	  focusing	  on	  organized	  labor's	  defense	  spending	  strategies	  during	  the	  Korean	  War,	  the	  fall-­‐out	  shelter	  hysteria	  of	  the	  late	  1950s	  and	  military	  procurement	  issues	  during	  the	  Kennedy	  administration,	  it	  seeks	  to	  reveal	  something	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  military	  industrial	  complex	  and	  the	  complicated	  context	  in	  which	  it	  evolved	  and	  operated.	  
	  
Early	  Initiatives	  	  By	  the	  1930s,	  despite	  tremendous	  advances,	  the	  American	  labor	  movement	  was	  split	  not	  only	  between	  the	  competing	  Congress	  of	  Industrial	  Organizations	  (CIO)	  and	  the	  American	  Federation	  of	  Labor	  (AFL),	  but	  also	  between	  internationalists	  and	  isolationists.	  Labor's	  internationalists,	  committed	  to	  anti-­‐fascism,	  urged	  greater	  support	  for	  struggling	  Britain.	  Increasingly	  involved	  in	  shaping	  policy,	  as	  a	  loyal	  
component	  of	  Roosevelt's	  New	  Deal	  coalition,	  some	  in	  labor	  also	  looked	  to	  inject	  labor-­‐friendly	  features	  into	  the	  rapidly	  developing	  defense	  industries.	  Sleeping	  Car	  Porters'	  leader	  A.	  Philip	  Randolph,	  for	  instance,	  pressured	  President	  Franklin	  Roosevelt	  into	  issuing	  an	  executive	  order	  desegregating	  the	  defense	  industries.	  As	  a	  member	  of	  the	  National	  Defense	  Advisory	  Council	  (NDAC),	  in	  1940,	  Amalgamated	  Clothing	  Workers	  President	  Sidney	  Hillman	  developed	  a	  program	  that	  would	  direct	  defense	  mobilization	  dollars	  to	  economically	  weak	  regions	  and	  businesses.	  While	  the	  NDAC,	  after	  some	  reluctance,	  did	  endorse	  a	  statement	  calling	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  Hillman's	  goals,	  longstanding	  hostility	  between	  organized	  labor	  and	  the	  military—which	  historian	  Paul	  Koistinen	  described	  as	  "rife	  with	  virulent	  labor-­‐haters"—combined	  with	  the	  general	  pressure	  of	  wartime	  mobilization	  to	  squelch	  labor's	  hopes	  for	  implementing	  the	  plan.7	  	  The	  postwar	  years	  posed	  grave	  challenges	  to	  both	  Roosevelt's	  New	  Deal	  coalition	  and	  to	  organized	  labor	  in	  general.	  Mainstream	  trade	  unionists	  and	  liberals	  demanded	  "full	  employment"	  policies	  after	  the	  war.	  The	  very	  term	  "full	  employment"—the	  call	  for	  aggressive	  Keynesian	  spending	  in	  both	  good	  and	  bad	  economic	  times	  to	  promote	  high	  levels	  of	  employment	  and	  economic	  growth—took	  on	  an	  almost	  magical	  connotation	  for	  laborities	  and	  liberals.8	  But	  a	  wave	  of	  postwar	  strikes	  generated	  limited	  results	  and	  stoked	  public	  anger	  against	  labor.	  A	  conservative	  resurgence	  allowed	  for	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  antilabor	  Taft-­‐Hartley	  Act	  in	  1947.	  Meanwhile,	  President	  Harry	  S.	  Truman's	  Fair	  Deal	  initiatives	  to	  expand	  the	  New	  Deal	  met	  with	  defeat	  in	  Congress.	  	  In	  1949,	  things	  took	  a	  turn	  for	  the	  worse.	  A	  sharp	  economic	  downturn	  spoiled	  the	  high	  hopes	  generated	  by	  Truman's	  surprise	  1948	  victory,	  which	  saw	  the	  Democrats	  retake	  Congress.	  By	  the	  Fall	  of	  1949,	  the	  unemployment	  rate,	  which	  had	  remained	  steadily	  under	  4%	  since	  the	  war,	  shot	  upwards	  to	  8%.	  Organized	  labor	  had	  real	  reason	  to	  fear	  that	  much-­‐dreaded	  Depression	  conditions	  were	  poised	  to	  return.	  President	  Truman,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  downturn,	  with	  labor's	  support,	  proposed	  that	  federal	  procurement	  and	  spending	  be	  directed	  to	  those	  areas	  hardest	  hit	  by	  unemployment.	  But	  the	  program,	  which	  never	  involved	  defense	  spending,	  had	  little	  support	  in	  Congress	  and	  died	  quickly.	  Hopes	  that	  the	  new	  Democratic	  Congress	  might	  adopt	  Fair	  Deal	  programs,	  such	  as	  public	  works	  projects	  and	  national	  health	  insurance,	  also	  evaporated.	  	  In	  the	  face	  of	  mounting	  challenges,	  mainstream	  organized	  labor	  sought,	  as	  best	  it	  could,	  to	  protect	  gains	  and	  meet	  the	  growing	  material	  needs	  of	  its	  rank-­‐and-­‐file.	  While	  dreams	  of	  expanding	  New	  Dealera	  programs	  were	  dead,	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Cold	  War—an	  enterprise	  in	  which	  the	  anticommunist	  wing	  of	  American	  labor	  was	  an	  active	  participant—offered	  opportunity.	  Compared	  to	  the	  perceived	  threat	  of	  expanded	  New	  Deal	  programs,	  business	  leaders	  were	  infinitely	  less	  hostile	  to	  military	  Keynesianism.	  "Military	  spending	  doesn't	  really	  alter	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  economy.	  It	  goes	  through	  the	  regular	  channels..	  .	  .	  But	  the	  kind	  of	  welfare	  and	  public-­‐works	  spending	  that	  Truman	  plans.	  .	  .creates	  new	  institutions.	  It	  redistributes	  income,"	  opined	  Business	  Week	  in	  1949.9	  Planners	  in	  the	  organized	  labor	  
movement,	  however,	  hoped	  and	  plotted	  to	  turn	  Business	  Week's	  equation	  on	  its	  head—to	  harness	  defense	  spending	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  addressing	  pressing	  economic	  and	  social	  problems.	  	  Such	  an	  approach	  appealed	  to	  labor	  on	  a	  number	  of	  levels.	  With	  many	  trade	  unionists	  increasingly	  dedicated	  anticommunists,	  a	  strong	  defense	  and	  Cold	  War	  posture	  had	  resonance.	  Likewise,	  the	  defense	  sector	  operated	  partly	  in	  the	  public	  sphere,	  and	  as	  such	  was	  less	  driven	  by	  market	  forces	  and	  more	  open	  to	  political	  influence.10	  In	  the	  face	  of	  determined	  opposition,	  this	  semi-­‐public	  realm,	  many	  in	  labor	  believed,	  offered	  the	  only	  viable	  venue	  through	  which	  to	  pursue	  equitable	  economic	  growth.	  By	  the	  late	  1940s,	  organized	  labor,	  to	  varying	  degrees,	  had	  retreated	  philosophically	  from	  its	  earlier	  flirtations	  with	  state	  cooperation.	  Many	  trade	  unionists	  now	  recognized	  the	  state	  as	  a	  potential	  hindrance.	  Increasingly	  they	  turned	  to	  military	  Keynesianism—in	  which	  government's	  function	  was	  to	  spend	  while	  labor	  and	  capital	  handled	  industrial	  relations.	  	  
Korean	  Crisis	  and	  Defense	  Manpower	  4	  	  Opportunity	  to	  push	  ahead	  came	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  Korean	  crisis	  beginning	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1950.	  The	  expansive	  increase	  in	  military	  outlays	  already	  called	  for	  in	  the	  NSC-­‐68	  plan,	  drafted	  in	  part	  by	  labor-­‐friendly	  Council	  of	  Economic	  Advisors	  Chairman	  Leon	  Keyserling,	  had	  won	  strong	  support	  in	  the	  labor	  movement.	  With	  the	  invasion	  of	  South	  Korea,	  both	  the	  AFL	  and	  CIO,	  increasingly	  concerned	  by	  what	  they	  saw	  as	  communist	  gains	  in	  the	  Third	  World,	  joined	  the	  chorus	  of	  calls	  for	  a	  firm	  response.	  With	  billions	  of	  dollars	  about	  to	  be	  spent,	  Korea	  offered	  the	  occasion	  to	  revive	  Hillman's	  program	  of	  molding	  the	  military-­‐industrial	  complex	  to	  address	  problems	  of	  economic	  inequality.	  Labor	  became	  insistent	  on	  having	  a	  voice	  in	  the	  shaping	  of	  defense	  mobilization—a	  real	  voice	  that	  would	  not	  be	  drowned	  out	  by	  competing	  interests,	  as	  they	  believed	  had	  been	  the	  case	  during	  World	  War	  II.11	  	  	  Indebted	  to	  organized	  labor	  for	  his	  1948	  victory	  and	  eager	  to	  keep	  it	  a	  content	  member	  of	  the	  Democratic	  coalition,	  Truman	  welcomed	  labor	  participation	  in	  defense	  mobilization	  planning.	  The	  AFL	  and	  CIO—putting	  aside	  their	  often	  bitter	  differences—formed	  a	  joint	  committee,	  the	  United	  Labor	  Policy	  Committee,	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  crisis.	  Additionally,	  Truman	  ordered	  each	  major	  defense	  agency	  to	  take	  on	  a	  labor	  advisor.	  A	  Committee	  on	  Defense	  Manpower	  and	  National	  Labor-­‐Management	  Policy,	  with	  several	  representatives	  of	  organized	  labor,	  convened	  within	  the	  Labor	  Department	  to	  oversee	  the	  nation's	  manpower	  requirements.12	  	  Organized	  labor	  members	  of	  the	  manpower	  committee	  immediately	  set	  out	  to	  formulate	  policies	  to	  direct	  defense	  spending	  to	  "labor	  surplus	  areas."13	  Jacob	  Potofsky,	  Hillman's	  successor	  as	  president	  of	  the	  Amalgamated	  Clothing	  Workers,	  forcefully	  argued	  for	  accelerated	  procurement	  of	  textiles	  and	  policies	  that	  would	  mandate	  "respect	  for	  labor	  standards"	  in	  the	  awarding	  of	  contracts.14	  Other	  factors—insisted	  Potofsky	  and	  organized	  labor—besides	  optimal	  efficiency	  and	  lowest	  cost	  had	  to	  be	  considered	  in	  the	  awarding	  of	  contracts.	  He	  sought	  specifically	  
to	  aid	  the	  severely	  slumping	  textile	  industry,	  and,	  by	  mandating	  labor	  standards,	  slow	  the	  drain	  of	  textile	  jobs	  to	  the	  non-­‐unionized	  South.	  The	  aim	  of	  organized	  labor,	  however,	  went	  well	  beyond	  the	  textile	  industry.	  Ultimately,	  unionists	  hoped	  to	  commandeer	  the	  entire	  emerging	  warfare	  state,	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  making	  it	  as	  responsive	  to	  the	  goals	  of	  promoting	  employment	  and	  meeting	  social	  needs	  as	  to	  fighting	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  Although	  the	  first	  several	  months	  of	  the	  Korean	  mobilization	  went	  smoothly	  for	  organized	  labor,	  by	  late	  1950,	  it	  became	  clear	  to	  Truman	  that	  the	  war	  would	  last	  longer	  than	  he	  had	  hoped	  and	  that	  full	  mobilization	  required	  greater	  organization	  and	  centralized	  authority.	  In	  a	  sweeping	  move,	  Truman	  consolidated	  control	  of	  defense	  production	  in	  one	  office	  within	  the	  Executive	  Department	  under	  General	  Electric	  President	  Charles	  Wilson.	  Labor's	  fears	  that	  a	  businessman,	  committed	  to	  the	  bottom	  line,	  might	  not	  be	  sympathetic	  to	  its	  agenda	  for	  the	  military-­‐industrial	  complex,	  quickly	  proved	  well	  grounded.	  Taking	  office,	  Wilson	  established	  his	  own	  manpower	  policy	  committee	  staffed	  with	  nonlabor	  advisers,	  and,	  while	  he	  permitted	  the	  Labor-­‐Management	  committee	  to	  continue	  its	  work—it	  was	  to	  operate	  only	  in	  a	  limited	  advisory	  capacity.	  When	  the	  Labor-­‐	  Management	  committee	  met	  on	  February	  13,	  1951,	  at	  the	  Department	  of	  Labor,	  both	  labor	  and	  management	  representatives	  exploded	  over	  what	  they	  saw	  as	  Wilson's	  usurpation	  of	  power.	  Potofsky	  inveighed	  that	  the	  existing	  board's	  mission	  had	  been	  undermined.	  He	  feared	  that	  his	  efforts	  to	  accelerate	  textile	  procurement	  and	  address	  other	  economic	  problems	  would	  be	  threatened	  by	  the	  newly	  streamlined	  regime.	  Incited	  by	  Potofsky,	  en	  masse,	  the	  members	  voted	  to	  dissolve	  the	  committee.15	  	  Several	  days	  later,	  the	  joint	  AFL	  and	  CIO	  United	  Labor	  Policy	  Committee	  called	  upon	  all	  labor	  representatives	  in	  defense	  mobilization	  agencies	  to	  "resign	  immediately,"	  and	  declared	  themselves	  "thoroughly	  disillusioned	  with	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  defense	  mobilization."16	  Although	  wage	  and	  price	  stabilization	  ranked	  as	  central	  issues,	  labor's	  strong	  desire	  to	  have	  a	  say	  in	  manpower	  and	  procurement	  issues	  contributed	  equally	  to	  the	  unprecedented	  walkout.17	  Labor	  intended	  the	  walkout	  to	  be	  a	  clear	  statement	  that—unlike	  the	  previous	  war,	  when	  many	  felt	  labor	  was	  relegated	  to	  a	  minor	  decision-­‐making	  role—this	  time	  it	  was	  prepared	  to	  use	  every	  means	  at	  its	  disposal	  to	  ensure	  that	  it	  have	  a	  real	  policy-­‐making	  position.	  	  Labor's	  high-­‐profile	  boycott	  and	  its	  political	  influence	  put	  pressure	  on	  Truman	  to	  address	  the	  situation.	  The	  president,	  in	  turn,	  pressured	  Wilson.	  After	  a	  several	  month-­‐long	  standoff,	  in	  late	  April	  1951,	  the	  mobilization	  czar	  agreed	  to	  substantial	  labor	  participation	  on	  policy-­‐making	  bodies	  as	  well	  as	  to	  a	  new	  formula	  for	  price	  and	  wage	  controls.	  	  Wilson's	  concession	  provided	  organized	  labor	  with	  the	  forum	  it	  needed	  to	  press	  forth	  its	  agenda;	  hence,	  labor	  dropped	  its	  boycott.	  But	  as	  the	  Office	  of	  Defense	  Mobilization	  hashed	  out	  the	  new	  representation	  arrangement,	  all	  sides	  recognized	  that	  the	  CIO	  and	  AFL	  remained	  too	  divided	  to	  share	  power	  effectively.	  Instead	  one	  
labor	  office	  was	  established	  within	  the	  Defense	  Production	  Agency	  (DPA)	  headed	  by	  AFL	  Vice	  President	  Joseph	  Keenan,	  while	  a	  separate	  office	  was	  created	  in	  the	  National	  Production	  Authority	  (NPA)	  under	  O.A.	  Knight	  of	  the	  Oil	  Workers-­‐CIO.	  The	  arrangement	  caused	  problems	  of	  "over-­‐lapping	  authority,"	  but	  it	  allowed	  both	  offices	  to	  function	  free	  of	  rivalries.18	  	  Of	  the	  two	  offices,	  the	  Labor	  Office	  in	  the	  NPA	  quickly	  established	  itself	  as	  the	  more	  aggressive.	  The	  NPA	  moved	  with	  dispatch	  to	  publicize	  the	  problem	  of	  distressed	  areas	  and	  industries—decrying	  regrettable	  idleness	  at	  a	  time	  of	  national	  emergency	  and	  mobilization.	  The	  labor	  office	  held	  a	  high-­‐profile	  meeting	  with	  CIO-­‐affiliated	  textile	  workers	  from	  hard-­‐hit	  Lawrence,	  Massachusetts,	  pleading	  for	  preferential	  treatment	  for	  the	  textile	  facilities	  in	  their	  city.	  To	  build	  support,	  the	  office	  also	  conducted	  a	  survey	  of	  area	  unemployment	  focusing	  on	  the	  plight	  of	  Belmont	  and	  lower	  Jefferson	  counties	  in	  Ohio—coincidentally	  the	  district	  of	  influential	  congressman	  Wayne	  Hayes,	  who	  eagerly	  sought	  help	  for	  his	  beleaguered	  constituency.	  The	  survey	  uncovered	  distressing	  industrial	  stagnation.	  It	  concluded	  that	  the	  situation	  required	  "immediate	  emergency	  action"	  and	  that	  "procurement	  agencies	  should	  be	  directed	  to	  place	  contracts	  in	  these	  areas.	  This	  should	  be	  done	  through	  negotiation	  rather	  than	  through	  the	  advertised	  bid	  procedure."19	  With	  the	  study,	  the	  NPA	  established	  the	  groundwork	  for	  policies	  that	  would	  elevate	  larger	  economic	  and	  human	  considerations	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  military	  procurement	  policy—over	  concerns	  for	  efficiency	  and	  cost.	  	  The	  release	  of	  the	  survey,	  essentially	  the	  Office	  of	  Labor's	  opening	  salvo,	  was	  not	  greeted	  warmly	  by	  military	  officials,	  who	  feared	  a	  new	  level	  of	  bureaucracy	  and	  complications	  that	  labor's	  program	  might	  engender.	  The	  Army	  had	  no	  authority,	  military	  officials	  insisted,	  to	  award	  contracts	  on	  any	  basis	  other	  than	  lowest	  cost.	  The	  Office	  of	  Labor	  cleverly	  countered	  by	  producing	  an	  apparently	  forgotten	  memorandum	  written	  the	  previous	  year	  by	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  George	  C.	  Marshall,	  advising	  that	  "availability	  of	  manpower	  in	  distressed	  employment	  areas	  or	  in	  areas	  of	  manpower	  shortages"	  should	  be	  among	  the	  factors	  considered	  in	  defense	  procurement.20	  	  	  	  Still,	  the	  Office	  of	  Labor	  and	  the	  Defense	  Department	  continued	  to	  bat	  the	  issue	  back	  and	  forth.	  Wilson,	  chastened	  but	  still	  no	  fan	  of	  labor's	  agenda,	  finally	  arbitrated	  the	  dispute	  by	  sending	  a	  request	  to	  the	  Comptroller	  General	  for	  a	  ruling	  on	  whether	  contracts	  could	  be	  awarded	  "in	  specific	  instances	  at	  prices	  other	  than	  the	  lowest	  which	  might	  be	  obtainable."	  To	  the	  chagrin	  of	  the	  Defense	  Department,	  the	  Comptroller	  General	  ruled	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  NPA's	  viewpoint.21	  	  With	  political	  pressure	  from	  labor	  and	  interested	  congressmen	  building,	  Wilson	  issued	  Defense	  Manpower	  Policy	  4	  (DMP4)	  on	  February	  7,	  1952.22	  The	  policy	  directed	  that	  special	  consideration	  be	  given	  to	  regions	  officially	  designated	  "labor	  surplus	  areas"	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  unemployment	  rate	  of	  6%	  or	  more	  and	  mandated	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Surplus	  Manpower	  Committee	  (SMC)	  to	  oversee	  the	  certification	  process.	  Wilson	  assigned	  veteran	  New	  Dealer	  and	  labor	  sympathizer	  
Arthur	  Flemming	  the	  job	  of	  chairing	  the	  committee.	  In	  spite	  of	  resistance	  from	  both	  the	  military	  and	  business	  interests,	  organized	  labor	  had	  managed	  to	  impose,	  on	  paper	  at	  least,	  its	  own	  program	  onto	  the	  military-­‐industrial	  complex.	  	  Armed	  with	  the	  new	  policy,	  Knight	  and	  his	  able	  aide,	  veteran	  CIO-­‐staffer	  Ted	  Silvey	  (who	  soon	  took	  over	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  operations	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  Labor),	  quickly	  moved	  to	  address	  the	  distressed	  areas	  problem.	  The	  most	  pressing	  issue	  was	  how	  contracts	  would	  be	  awarded	  under	  the	  new	  system.	  Again	  tension	  surfaced	  with	  the	  Defense	  Department.	  Clearly,	  no	  one	  wanted	  to	  see	  the	  government	  paying	  excessive	  defense	  production	  costs	  to	  accommodate	  distressed	  areas—such	  arrangements	  most	  certainly	  would	  produce	  negative	  publicity	  and	  potentially	  undermine	  the	  entire	  project.	  The	  SMC	  preferred	  to	  "set-­‐aside"	  certain	  portions	  of	  defense	  contracts	  for	  labor	  surplus	  area	  firms.	  Such	  set-­‐aside	  contracts	  would	  be	  negotiated	  directly	  with	  firms	  in	  distressed	  areas	  with	  every	  effort	  made	  to	  keep	  bids	  within	  the	  general	  price	  range	  of	  the	  open	  bidding	  process.	  However,	  the	  rules	  and	  procedures	  to	  govern	  DMP4	  were	  left	  largely	  to	  procurement	  offices,	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  chose	  simply	  to	  ignore	  Wilson's	  directive.	  After	  just	  a	  few	  meetings	  of	  the	  SMC,	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Anna	  Rosenberg—dismissively	  explaining	  that	  she	  did	  not	  believe	  DMP4	  placed	  the	  Defense	  Department	  under	  any	  obligation	  to	  direct	  contracts	  to	  areas	  where	  unemployment	  was	  not	  a	  result	  of	  defense	  conversion—stopped	  attending.23	  Without	  statutory	  power	  behind	  the	  mandate,	  officials	  like	  Rosenberg	  could	  sidestep	  the	  policies.	  Yet,	  organized	  labor	  was	  not	  politically	  in	  a	  position	  to	  propose	  a	  law	  or	  amendment	  codifying	  DMP4.	  	  Alongside	  their	  procurement	  efforts,	  the	  NPA	  Office	  of	  Labor	  exerted	  influence	  in	  other	  ways	  to	  help	  depressed	  areas.	  Government	  restrictions	  on	  the	  use	  of	  copper	  and	  other	  metals	  created	  real	  hardships	  for	  Oneida,	  Ltd.,	  an	  upstate	  New	  York	  firm	  specializing	  in	  flatware	  and	  silver,	  and	  located	  in	  a	  labor	  surplus	  area.	  Lack	  of	  raw	  materials	  had	  idled	  some	  seven	  hundred	  workers	  at	  the	  Oneida	  plant,	  and	  the	  firm	  expected	  to	  lay	  off	  more	  workers.	  The	  Office	  of	  Labor	  successfully	  appealed	  on	  behalf	  of	  Oneida	  under	  provisions	  recognizing	  the	  hardships	  that	  rationing	  created	  for	  certain	  communities.	  As	  a	  result,	  workers	  in	  Oneida	  returned	  to	  their	  jobs.24	  	  Within	  a	  year,	  Silvey	  and	  Knight	  were	  relatively	  pleased	  with	  their	  progress.	  Between	  late	  March	  and	  December	  1952,	  procurement	  officers	  awarded	  more	  than	  $1.5	  billion	  in	  defense	  contracts	  to	  labor	  surplus	  areas,	  although	  only	  roughly	  $48	  million	  involved	  preferential	  arrangements.	  Of	  sixty	  localities	  originally	  certified	  by	  the	  SMC	  as	  surplus	  areas,	  the	  situations	  in	  twenty-­‐one	  of	  the	  sixty	  already	  had	  allowed	  for	  their	  removal	  from	  the	  distressed	  list	  by	  March	  1953.25	  Beyond	  this,	  Silvey	  believed	  that	  in	  many	  cases,	  the	  Office	  of	  Labor's	  initiatives	  to	  publicize	  opportunities	  paid	  off	  simply	  by	  informing	  firms	  in	  distressed	  areas	  of	  available	  contracts	  that	  they	  often	  won	  by	  submitting	  winning	  bids	  without	  preference.	  More	  clinics	  and	  greater	  cooperation	  from	  the	  Defense	  Department,	  Silvey	  and	  associates	  believed,	  would	  draw	  even	  more	  dollars	  into	  distressed	  regions.26	  	  
In	  practice,	  however,	  numerous	  factors	  continued	  to	  complicate	  the	  process.	  For	  instance,	  procurement	  officers	  accepted	  multiple	  bids	  on	  many	  products	  at	  different	  price	  levels.	  In	  cases	  where	  firms	  in	  distressed	  areas	  were	  extended	  the	  opportunity	  to	  meet	  bids,	  Silvey	  in	  the	  Office	  of	  Labor	  felt	  that	  a	  labor	  surplus	  area	  bid	  should	  have	  to	  meet	  only	  the	  highest	  bid,	  whereas	  military	  procurement	  officers	  insisted	  on	  the	  lowest	  bid.	  An	  ongoing	  battle,	  thus,	  raged	  between	  organized	  labor	  and	  the	  military	  over	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  defense	  spending	  policies.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  persistent	  tensions	  over	  administration,	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  preference	  programs	  seemed	  to	  be	  bypassing	  some	  sectors.	  One	  area,	  in	  particular,	  showed	  little	  improvement:	  the	  textile	  industries	  in	  distressed	  New	  England,	  where	  unemployment	  had	  soared	  as	  firms	  moved	  south	  in	  search	  of	  cheaper	  labor.	  The	  concerns	  of	  Potofsky	  of	  the	  ACW	  and	  of	  the	  CIO	  Textile	  Workers	  Union	  for	  the	  faltering	  textile	  industry	  provided	  the	  original	  inspiration	  to	  aid	  labor	  surplus	  areas,	  but	  the	  preferences	  had	  done	  little	  to	  help	  New	  England.	  By	  early	  1952,	  the	  textile	  industry	  was	  in	  a	  deep	  depression,	  and	  New	  England	  mills	  were	  hit	  the	  hardest.	  Worsted	  and	  woolen	  mills	  in	  New	  England	  operated	  at	  roughly	  40	  percent	  capacity.27	  The	  rules	  of	  DMP4,	  however,	  required	  that	  before	  preferences	  were	  granted,	  a	  national	  public	  hearing	  be	  held	  to	  assess	  the	  impact	  of	  regional	  preferential	  treatment	  on	  the	  national	  health	  of	  the	  particular	  industry.	  With	  the	  textile	  industry	  split	  between	  the	  largely	  unorganized	  South	  and	  the	  dying	  northern	  mills,	  the	  industry	  hearing	  on	  March	  20,	  1952,	  where	  southern	  firms	  vehemently	  opposed	  preferences,	  yielded	  a	  bitter	  stalemate.	  In	  place	  of	  preferences	  for	  particular	  regions,	  the	  Office	  of	  Defense	  Mobilization	  developed	  a	  weak	  compromise	  formula	  of	  favoring	  plants	  operating	  eighty	  hours	  or	  fewer	  per	  week.	  But	  the	  eighty-­‐hour	  arrangement	  proved	  complicated	  and	  difficult	  to	  administer.	  Factories	  working	  at	  a	  limited	  capacity	  were	  hard	  put	  to	  meet	  low	  bids,	  and	  the	  Defense	  Department	  preferred	  simply	  to	  ignore	  the	  preferential	  policy	  when	  it	  came	  to	  textiles.28	  	  With	  New	  England	  textile	  towns	  such	  as	  Lawrence	  clearly	  suffering,	  Ted	  Silvey	  saw	  the	  compromise	  as	  a	  betrayal.	  "To	  exclude	  the	  textile	  industry	  entirely	  from	  area	  preference,"	  Silvey	  wrote	  to	  the	  acting	  head	  of	  Defense	  Mobilization,	  "would	  not	  assure	  giving	  aid	  where	  it	  is	  needed	  most	  .	  .	  .	  the	  Communist	  party	  has	  seized	  on	  the	  acute	  distress	  in	  Lawrence	  for	  propaganda	  purposes	  as	  evidenced	  by	  their	  attempts	  to	  attract	  people	  to	  a	  communist	  rally	  in	  that	  city."	  Not	  even	  Silvey's	  evocation	  of	  the	  "great	  fear,"	  however,	  could	  help	  New	  England's	  textile	  industry.29	  The	  Office	  of	  Labor	  continued	  to	  press	  the	  issue	  and	  managed	  to	  extract	  some	  promises	  to	  use	  set-­‐asides,	  but	  overall	  New	  England	  textiles	  received	  little	  to	  no	  help.30	  	  The	  failure	  to	  truly	  aid	  New	  England's	  distressed	  areas	  underscored	  an	  always	  present	  recognition	  within	  the	  Office	  of	  Labor	  and	  in	  the	  labor	  movement	  in	  general:	  that	  preferential	  programs	  "are	  only	  a	  partial	  and	  temporary	  solution	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  these	  declining	  areas."31	  Real	  change	  would	  mean	  a	  much	  larger,	  more	  fundamental	  commitment	  to	  full	  employment	  policies,	  but	  even	  the	  Employment	  Act	  of	  1946,	  constantly	  cited	  by	  organized	  labor,	  contained	  no	  real	  mandate	  for	  action.	  
But	  such	  a	  commitment	  was	  a	  political	  impossibility	  with	  the	  country	  still	  very	  much	  in	  a	  conservative	  mood.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  social	  Keynesian	  alternatives,	  DMP4	  offered	  vital	  help,	  albeit	  with	  limits,	  to	  struggling	  industries,	  communities,	  and	  people.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  determined	  resistance	  to	  the	  policy,	  the	  doggedness	  of	  labor's	  representatives	  eventually	  allowed	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  two	  methods	  to	  direct	  spending	  to	  surplus	  areas.	  The	  first	  arrangement	  offered	  firms	  in	  labor	  surplus	  areas	  the	  opportunity	  to	  meet	  the	  lowest	  bid	  on	  a	  certain	  contract	  if	  their	  bids	  came	  within	  20	  percent	  of	  the	  lowest	  bid.	  The	  second	  method	  reserved	  contracts	  or	  portions	  of	  contracts	  for	  labor	  surplus	  areas.	  This	  procedure	  did	  not	  require	  a	  contractor	  in	  a	  labor	  surplus	  area	  to	  meet	  a	  lowest	  bid,	  although	  some	  bidding	  and	  negotiations	  still	  took	  place.	  Thus,	  the	  set-­‐aside	  procedure,	  placing	  human	  needs	  first,	  operated	  somewhat	  outside	  of	  the	  bounds	  of	  market	  forces.	  	  To	  counterbalance	  military	  indifference,	  both	  the	  DPA	  and	  the	  NPA	  aggressively	  worked	  to	  spread	  awareness	  of	  the	  new	  system	  of	  distressed	  area	  preferences.	  With	  agencies	  actively	  resisting,	  simply	  having	  policies	  on	  the	  books	  was	  not	  enough.	  Laborites	  had	  to	  promote	  and	  lobby	  actively	  to	  make	  the	  policies	  work.	  The	  NPA	  sponsored	  clinics	  in	  twenty-­‐four	  cities	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  place	  contracts.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  DPA	  created	  a	  Defense	  Distressed	  Areas	  Task	  Force	  aimed	  particularly	  at	  helping	  slumping	  Detroit	  take	  advantage	  of	  defense	  contracts.32	  	  
Stagnation	  and	  Sputnik	  	  By	  early	  1953,	  the	  conflict	  in	  Korea	  was	  winding	  down,	  and	  Americans	  elected	  Dwight	  Eisenhower	  president	  partly	  on	  his	  promise	  to	  lift	  wartime	  controls	  on	  the	  economy.	  Republicans	  also	  took	  control	  of	  the	  Senate,	  essentially	  dooming	  any	  social	  welfare	  legislation	  that	  might	  arise	  in	  Congress.	  The	  new	  president	  brought	  a	  more	  conservative	  fiscal	  approach	  to	  the	  executive	  branch	  and	  a	  real	  concern	  about	  the	  impact	  and	  implications	  of	  heavy	  defense	  spending.	  He	  was	  certainly	  not	  a	  military	  Keynesian—and	  barely	  a	  Keynesian	  at	  all.33	  	  Things	  took	  a	  downward	  turn	  for	  labor's	  defense	  agenda	  almost	  immediately.	  With	  the	  national	  emergency	  over,	  the	  NPA's	  Office	  of	  Labor	  disbanded	  on	  April	  13,	  1953.	  As	  a	  result,	  organized	  labor	  lost	  its	  inside	  bureaucratic	  niche	  from	  which	  to	  fight	  hostile	  forces	  in	  the	  battle	  to	  enforce	  preferential	  policies—a	  loss	  from	  which	  it	  never	  fully	  recovered.	  Labor's	  only	  hope	  was	  that	  Eisenhower	  was	  sincere	  while	  campaigning	  for	  the	  presidency	  in	  Lawrence,	  Massachusetts,	  when	  he	  told	  unemployed	  textile	  workers	  that	  he	  favored	  programs	  that	  would	  direct	  defense	  contracts	  to	  distressed	  areas.34	  In	  office,	  however,	  Eisenhower	  appeared	  to	  forget	  his	  promise.	  On	  August	  19,	  1953,	  the	  Office	  of	  Defense	  Mobilization	  suspended	  all	  preferential	  policies	  in	  the	  granting	  of	  defense	  contracts.	  Southern	  senators,	  long	  dismayed	  by	  DMP4,	  which	  they	  believed	  favored	  northern	  industry	  over	  the	  South,	  had	  moved	  already	  to	  prohibit	  policies	  that	  allowed	  price	  differentials	  on	  defense	  contracts	  based	  on	  factors	  such	  as	  social	  welfare	  concerns.35	  
	  Critics	  derided	  Eisenhower's	  cabinet	  as	  nine	  millionaires	  and	  a	  plumber.	  During	  his	  brief	  tenure	  in	  office,	  the	  plumber,	  Secretary	  of	  Labor	  Martin	  Durkin,	  tried	  to	  develop	  new	  policies	  to	  favor	  depressed	  areas,	  but	  the	  conservative	  atmosphere	  in	  the	  new	  administration	  frustrated	  his	  early	  efforts.36	  By	  late	  1953,	  however,	  the	  economy	  was	  losing	  steam.	  Reconversion	  from	  the	  war	  and	  Eisenhower's	  insistence	  on	  cutting	  spending,	  particularly	  defense	  spending,	  weakened	  the	  economy.	  Unemployment	  edged	  upward,	  and	  the	  president	  worried	  that	  he,	  like	  the	  previous	  Republican	  in	  office,	  might	  be	  blamed	  for	  a	  Depression.	  In	  a	  pattern	  that	  repeated	  itself	  with	  every	  economic	  downturn,	  labor	  used	  the	  slowdown	  as	  a	  pretext	  to	  call	  for	  higher	  defense	  spending	  and	  a	  revival	  of	  DMP4.	  Just	  after	  Christmas,	  Eisenhower	  responded	  with	  a	  memorandum	  to	  his	  secretary	  of	  defense,	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  Atomic	  Energy	  Commission,	  and	  the	  administrator	  of	  the	  General	  Services	  Administration	  urging	  them	  to	  cooperate	  in	  a	  renewed	  effort	  by	  the	  Office	  of	  Defense	  Mobilization	  to	  place	  defense	  contracts	  in	  labor	  surplus	  areas.37	  William	  Pollack,	  president	  of	  the	  CIO-­‐Textile	  Workers,	  breathed	  a	  sigh	  of	  relief	  at	  the	  news,	  but	  pointed	  to	  the	  limits	  of	  defense	  spending	  as	  a	  permanent	  response	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  distressed	  areas	  and	  industries;	  such	  actions,	  he	  reminded	  the	  administration,	  would	  only	  "scrape	  the	  surface	  of	  mass	  unemployment	  in	  textile	  towns."38	  	  Opponents	  of	  preferences,	  however,	  were	  not	  going	  to	  stand	  by	  idly.	  The	  threatened	  return	  of	  preferential	  treatment	  in	  granting	  contracts	  caused	  a	  minor	  upheaval	  among	  southern	  senators.	  Senator	  William	  Fulbright	  (Democrat—Arkansas)	  argued	  that	  the	  policies	  "opened	  the	  door	  to	  all	  kinds	  of	  favoritism."	  Senator	  Burnet	  Maybank	  (Democrat—South	  Carolina)	  called	  the	  president's	  initiatives	  "outrageous."	  But	  perhaps	  the	  scales	  were	  tipped	  when	  William	  Knowland,	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  Senate	  Republicans	  from	  California	  (a	  state	  in	  which	  one-­‐third	  of	  nonagricultural	  workers	  depended	  on	  defense	  work),	  added	  his	  voice	  to	  those	  protesting	  preferences.39	  Sensing	  political	  trouble,	  Eisenhower	  backed	  away	  from	  his	  commitment.	  At	  his	  January	  15,	  1954	  news	  conference,	  the	  president	  noted	  certain	  "misapprehensions"	  about	  his	  advocacy	  of	  preferences	  and	  dismissed	  the	  "exaggerated	  idea	  that	  entire	  contracts	  would	  be	  shoved	  somewhere	  just	  because	  they	  had	  unemployment."40	  	  Eisenhower	  did	  implement	  a	  scaled-­‐down	  version	  of	  preferences,	  but	  as	  developments	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  suggested,	  policy	  initiatives	  and	  directives	  alone	  accomplished	  little	  (laws	  might	  have	  done	  more—but	  were	  not	  politically	  viable).	  Success	  required	  inside	  bureaucratic	  vigilance	  and	  vigorous	  affirmative	  action	  to	  overcome	  hostility	  from	  both	  political	  parties	  and	  the	  military.	  With	  no	  such	  group	  of	  activists	  in	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  and	  virtually	  no	  support	  from	  the	  executive,	  failure	  almost	  was	  guaranteed.	  In	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  1954,	  defense	  contracts	  awarded	  by	  preference	  amounted	  to	  only	  a	  meager	  $163,149.	  Textile	  preferences	  came	  to	  only	  $16,214—virtually	  nothing.41	  	  
With	  the	  door	  firmly	  shut	  on	  programs	  to	  channel	  defense	  spending	  to	  meet	  specific	  economic	  needs,	  organized	  labor	  turned	  to	  the	  more	  generalized	  aspect	  of	  its	  approach	  to	  the	  military-­‐industrial	  complex.	  Still	  committed	  to	  promoting	  pro-­‐growth	  military	  Keynesian	  spending,	  labor	  continued	  its	  call	  for	  overall	  increases	  in	  defense	  outlays,	  which	  it	  believed	  fueled	  economic	  growth	  and	  spurred	  recovery	  from	  downturns.42	  A	  stable,	  growing	  economy,	  lifting	  workers	  into	  a	  more	  secure	  middle-­‐class	  existence	  remained	  the	  primary	  goal	  of	  postwar	  labor,	  and	  defense	  spending	  offered	  a	  viable	  route	  to	  that	  destination.	  Indeed,	  on	  this	  macroeconomic	  level,	  labor	  always	  enjoyed	  more	  success	  than	  with	  its	  programs	  aimed	  at	  helping	  specific	  regions	  and	  individuals.	  After	  several	  good	  economic	  years	  following	  the	  recovery	  from	  the	  1954	  recession,	  tight	  fiscal	  and	  monetary	  policies	  led	  to	  a	  second	  Eisenhower	  recession	  in	  late	  1957	  and	  1958.	  By	  the	  spring	  of	  1958,	  the	  Labor	  Department	  had	  added	  twenty-­‐one	  communities	  to	  its	  list	  of	  areas	  with	  substantial	  labor	  surpluses	  (unemployment	  rates	  of	  over	  6	  percent),	  including	  Youngstown,	  Ohio;	  Bridgeport,	  Connecticut;	  and	  St	  Louis.	  In	  April,	  unemployment	  soared	  above	  7	  percent	  nationally	  and	  continued	  to	  climb.	  In	  March,	  Eisenhower	  reluctantly	  agreed	  to	  meet	  with	  an	  eight-­‐man	  AFL-­‐CIO	  Committee	  to	  discuss	  rising	  unemployment.43	  The	  AFL-­‐CIO's	  answer	  to	  the	  sharp	  recession	  of	  1958	  was,	  of	  course,	  public	  works	  and	  defense	  spending,	  along	  with	  a	  recommended	  tax	  cut	  and	  expanded	  federal	  unemployment	  insurance.44	  	  The	  Soviet	  launching	  of	  Sputnik	  in	  the	  Fall	  of	  1957	  shook	  Americans	  profoundly—just	  as	  the	  U.S.	  economy	  collapsed	  into	  recession.	  AFL-­‐CIO	  President	  George	  Meany	  eagerly	  equated	  geopolitical	  and	  domestic	  issues	  by	  insisting	  that	  high	  unemployment	  "could	  very	  well	  lead	  to	  a	  situation	  for	  which	  the	  Kremlin	  has	  been	  hoping	  and	  expecting—the	  collapse	  of	  the	  U.S.	  domestic	  economy	  which	  could	  give	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  a	  victory	  over	  us	  without	  firing	  a	  shot."45	  Responding	  to	  the	  concurrent	  military	  and	  economic	  crises,	  	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  Executive	  Council	  concluded	  in	  February	  1958	  that	  in	  each	  problem	  lay	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  other.	  "[T]he	  time	  is	  now—not	  tomorrow—for	  a	  bold	  program	  to	  lift	  the	  economy	  out	  of	  its	  slump	  and	  national	  defense	  out	  of	  its	  dangerous	  lag,"	  blasted	  the	  Executive	  Council.	  "Prosperity	  and	  strong	  national	  defense	  are	  both	  feasible."46	  Eisenhower,	  while	  privately	  bemoaning	  "Sputnik	  complexes,"	  met	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  halfway	  by	  cooperating	  with	  Congress	  to	  raise	  defense	  expenditures	  roughly	  $1.1	  billion	  in	  1958	  and	  requesting	  a	  $5	  billion	  increase	  in	  the	  national	  debt	  limit,	  thus	  easing	  his	  restrictive	  fiscal	  policies.47	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Board	  reacted	  to	  pressure	  by	  easing	  the	  discount	  rate,	  another	  demand	  of	  organized	  labor.48	  	  Eisenhower's	  new	  outlays	  combined	  with	  new	  expenditures	  for	  a	  federal	  highway	  system	  and	  other	  spending	  pulled	  the	  country	  out	  of	  the	  recession,	  at	  least	  temporarily.	  Before	  Congress	  the	  next	  year,	  Walter	  Reuther	  credited	  the	  increase	  in	  defense	  spending	  with	  generating	  the	  recovery.49	  Sputnik	  and	  the	  recession	  provided	  a	  powerful	  lesson	  to	  laborites	  and	  Keynesians	  alike:	  while	  unemployment	  alone	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  move	  the	  government	  to	  action,	  economic	  worries	  combined	  with	  national	  security	  concerns,	  such	  as	  those	  provided	  by	  Sputnik,	  created	  a	  climate	  ripe	  for	  spending	  initiatives.	  
	  
"A	  Family	  Fallout	  Shelter	  in	  Every	  Home"	  	  Although	  unemployment	  leveled	  off	  at	  around	  5.5	  percent	  by	  the	  late	  1950s,	  the	  problem	  of	  chronically	  depressed	  areas	  persisted	  and	  increasingly	  drew	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  larger	  public.50	  The	  AFL-­‐CIO	  became	  a	  strong	  supporter	  of	  Senator	  Paul	  Douglas's	  Area	  Redevelopment	  Bill,	  which	  would	  provide	  loans	  and	  job	  training	  directed	  at	  distressed	  areas.51	  But	  Eisenhower,	  eager	  to	  keep	  a	  handle	  on	  public	  spending,	  consistently	  vetoed	  the	  bill.	  	  Alongside	  the	  problem	  of	  distressed	  areas	  lay	  the	  problem	  of	  depressed	  industries.	  From	  a	  postwar	  high	  in	  the	  early	  1950s,	  housing	  construction	  fell	  off	  sharply	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade.	  In	  1960,	  the	  unemployment	  rate	  in	  the	  building	  and	  construction	  trades	  stood	  at	  12	  percent.	  AFL-­‐CIO	  Building	  and	  Construction	  Trades	  Department	  head	  C.	  J.	  Haggerty	  hoped	  that	  increased	  federal	  spending	  on	  airport	  and	  highway	  construction	  would	  help	  ease	  the	  unemployment	  situation.	  But,	  in	  his	  quest	  for	  federal	  support,	  Haggerty	  did	  more	  than	  just	  hope.	  With	  the	  arms	  race	  growing	  evermore	  dangerous	  in	  the	  late	  1950s,	  public	  fears	  of	  a	  nuclear	  exchange	  grew.	  To	  deal	  with	  the	  threat,	  the	  federal	  Office	  of	  Civil	  Defense	  Mobilization,	  which	  included	  a	  labor	  advisory	  board,	  began	  promoting	  the	  construction	  of	  fallout	  shelters.	  To	  Haggerty,	  desperate	  to	  find	  work	  for	  his	  unemployed	  legions,	  shelter	  construction	  meant	  jobs.	  Together	  with	  Michael	  Smith,	  the	  Office	  of	  Civil	  Defense	  labor	  liaison,	  Haggerty	  developed	  a	  nationwide	  promotional	  program	  in	  which	  AFL-­‐CIO	  Building	  and	  Trades	  affiliates	  combined	  with	  local	  suppliers	  to	  build	  "demonstrator"	  shelters	  designed	  to	  raise	  awareness	  of	  the	  need	  for	  such	  designs.	  Haggerty	  neatly	  summarized	  his	  goals	  in	  his	  shelter	  program	  slogan:	  "a	  demonstration	  fallout	  shelter	  in	  every	  city	  and	  a	  family	  fallout	  shelter	  in	  every	  home."52	  	  The	  AFL-­‐CIO	  Building	  and	  Construction	  Trades	  Department	  and	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  advisory	  committee	  to	  the	  Office	  of	  Civil	  Defense	  aggressively	  lobbied	  Congress	  to	  follow	  up	  on	  the	  demonstrator	  program	  with	  massive	  subsidies	  for	  fallout	  shelters.	  The	  advisory	  committee	  also	  insisted	  that	  all	  construction	  on	  fallout	  shelters	  financed	  or	  subsidized	  by	  government	  money	  would	  be	  subject	  to	  Davis-­‐Bacon	  Act	  provisions,	  mandating	  certain	  standards	  for	  labor.	  Both	  Haggerty	  and	  Smith	  candidly	  explained	  that	  their	  efforts,	  while	  aimed	  at	  the	  nuclear	  threat,	  also	  addressed	  pressing	  economic	  concerns.	  "[A]s	  a	  result	  of	  this	  vitally	  needed	  protection,	  by	  the	  construction	  of	  family	  shelters	  in	  the	  homes,"	  wrote	  Haggerty	  to	  affiliated	  locals,	  "a	  definite	  increase	  occurs	  to	  the	  workload	  in	  the	  form	  of	  new	  construction	  in	  the	  areas	  involved."53	  Like	  DMP4,	  the	  shelter	  drive	  brought	  only	  temporary	  relief	  to	  workers	  suffering	  the	  slings	  and	  arrows	  of	  the	  sputtering	  economy	  of	  the	  1950s.	  The	  panic	  that	  drove	  the	  shelter	  program	  passed	  by	  the	  early	  1960s.	  Likewise,	  as	  the	  economy	  improved,	  construction	  workers	  were	  able	  to	  look	  to	  other	  less	  gloomy	  employment.	  	  
"Buying	  Only	  What	  We	  Need"	  	  
Laborites	  greeted	  the	  election	  of	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  in	  1960	  with	  high	  hopes	  of	  more	  vigorous	  spending	  policies	  to	  spur	  economic	  growth.	  Representing	  Massachusetts	  in	  Congress,	  Kennedy	  had	  been	  a	  strong	  advocate	  and	  beneficiary	  of	  programs	  such	  as	  DMP4.	  During	  the	  1960	  election,	  Kennedy	  had	  profited	  both	  from	  the	  dismal	  state	  of	  the	  economy,	  with	  unemployment	  nearing	  7	  percent,	  and	  from	  a	  general	  sense	  that	  America	  was	  losing	  the	  Cold	  War.	  He	  promised	  "to	  get	  America	  moving	  again"	  and	  to	  expand	  American	  military	  capabilities.	  As	  Kennedy	  assumed	  the	  presidency,	  labor	  anticipated	  an	  active	  voice	  in	  the	  allocation	  of	  new	  defense	  dollars.	  	  The	  help	  was	  very	  much	  needed.	  The	  high	  rate	  of	  unemployment	  and	  the	  second	  recession	  in	  three	  years	  as	  Kennedy	  took	  office	  gravely	  concerned	  labor.	  "The	  country	  stands	  today	  on	  the	  threshold	  of	  the	  gravest	  economic	  crisis	  since	  the	  great	  depression	  of	  the	  thirties.	  The	  current	  statistics	  are	  alarming	  .	  .	  .the	  long-­‐range	  outlook	  is	  ever	  grimmer,"	  warned	  George	  Meany	  in	  early	  1961.54	  Alongside	  higher	  defense	  spending,	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  called	  for	  a	  thirty-­‐five-­‐hour	  week	  and	  an	  aggressive	  public	  works	  program.	  The	  twin	  factors	  of	  a	  sympathetic	  president	  and	  an	  economic	  downturn	  boded	  well	  for	  a	  revival	  of	  programs	  such	  as	  DMP4.	  	  President	  Kennedy	  moved	  quickly	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  unemployment.	  He	  signed	  the	  Douglas	  Area	  Redevelopment	  Act	  in	  early	  1961	  and	  unshackled	  defense	  spending.55	  After	  several	  years	  of	  neglect,	  Kennedy	  also	  moved	  to	  revive	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  DMP4.	  He	  instructed	  his	  secretary	  of	  defense,	  Robert	  S.	  McNamara,	  to	  begin	  a	  vigorous	  program	  of	  directing	  defense	  contracts	  to	  labor	  surplus	  areas,	  a	  program	  dubbed	  "Operation	  Booster."56	  Kennedy	  and	  McNamara	  applied	  pressure	  to	  their	  subordinates	  to	  insure	  that	  they	  made	  every	  effort	  to	  enforce	  the	  revived	  policies.	  The	  Army's	  Quartermaster	  General	  in	  turn	  issued	  a	  memo	  to	  procurement	  officers	  explaining	  that	  it	  is	  the	  "duty	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Army	  to	  respond	  to	  this	  request	  by	  exerting	  every	  possible	  effort	  to	  alleviate	  this	  most	  pressing	  economic	  problem."57	  The	  deputy	  assistant	  secretary	  of	  defense	  for	  supply	  and	  logistics	  likewise	  ordered	  that	  "active	  steps"	  be	  taken	  to	  place	  contracts	  in	  labor	  surplus	  areas.58	  	  Despite	  Kennedy's	  urgency,	  within	  a	  year	  the	  tide	  had	  turned	  against	  "Operation	  Booster."	  By	  early	  1962,	  Secretary	  of	  Labor,	  Arthur	  Goldberg,	  complained	  openly	  about	  a	  missile	  contract	  going	  to	  an	  area	  of	  California	  with	  a	  skill	  shortage	  rather	  than	  to	  a	  Baltimore	  corporation	  in	  a	  labor	  surplus	  area.59	  The	  AFL-­‐CIO	  was	  soon	  assailing	  the	  Kennedy	  administration's	  "timid"	  approach	  to	  economic	  problems.60	  By	  mid-­‐1962,	  Senator	  Jacob	  Javits	  (Republican—New	  York),	  frustrated	  by	  the	  failure	  of	  labor	  surplus	  areas	  in	  his	  state	  to	  receive	  preferences,	  lamented	  that	  the	  administration's	  neglect	  of	  its	  own	  policy	  of	  channeling	  defense	  contracts	  to	  distressed	  communities	  had	  "reached	  appalling	  proportions."61	  	  The	  partial	  recovery	  of	  the	  economy	  clearly	  took	  pressure	  away	  from	  the	  need	  to	  implement	  "Operation	  Booster."	  More	  than	  just	  neglect,	  however,	  was	  behind	  the	  desertion	  of	  preferential	  policies	  under	  Kennedy.	  Influenced	  by	  President	  Eisenhower's	  farewell	  address	  warning	  about	  the	  military-­‐industrial	  complex,	  and	  
the	  increasing	  expression	  of	  concern	  on	  the	  part	  of	  economists	  such	  as	  Seymour	  Melman,	  President	  Kennedy—through	  Robert	  McNamara—initiated	  an	  effort	  to	  depoliticize,	  modernize,	  and	  reorganize	  defense	  procurement.62	  Under	  Budget	  Director	  David	  Bell,	  Kennedy	  ordered	  an	  extensive	  study	  of	  defense	  contracting,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  a	  grant	  from	  the	  Ford	  Foundation.	  The	  Bell	  report,	  issued	  in	  1962,	  uncovered	  significant	  inefficiency	  and	  waste	  in	  defense	  contracting.	  While	  such	  factors	  never	  ranked	  high	  among	  labor's	  concerns,	  McNamara	  was	  determined	  to	  bring	  organization,	  efficiency,	  and	  a	  new	  business	  spirit	  to	  the	  military-­‐industrial	  complex.	  	  Using	  the	  Bell	  report	  he	  helped	  craft,	  McNamara—like	  Charles	  Wilson	  before	  him,	  an	  automobile	  industry	  executive	  with	  little	  patience	  for	  organized	  labor—set	  out	  to	  impose	  his	  vision	  on	  the	  defense	  establishment.	  He	  consolidated	  the	  far-­‐reaching	  procurement	  offices	  of	  the	  military	  into	  one	  body,	  the	  Defense	  Supply	  Agency	  (DSA),	  within	  the	  Defense	  Department.	  The	  guiding	  principle	  of	  the	  new	  DSA	  was	  keeping	  inventories	  low,	  "buying	  only	  what	  we	  need,"	  and	  "buying	  it	  at	  the	  lowest	  price	  possible."	  To	  promote	  absolute	  efficiency,	  McNamara	  set	  out	  to	  change	  fundamentally	  the	  nature	  of	  defense	  contracting.	  Most	  military	  contracting	  had	  been	  previously	  placed	  through	  a	  system	  known	  as	  "cost-­‐plus"	  contracting,	  in	  which	  a	  contractor	  could	  charge	  for	  costs	  incurred	  plus	  a	  guaranteed	  profit.	  In	  certain	  cases,	  as	  McNamara	  persistently	  pointed	  out,	  a	  contractor	  might	  actually	  risk	  part	  of	  his	  profit	  if	  he	  reduced	  costs.	  In	  place	  of	  such	  contracts,	  McNamara	  proposed	  "fixed-­‐price"	  or	  "price-­‐incentive	  contracts"	  in	  which	  contractors	  took	  greater	  risks	  and	  earned	  rewards	  for	  efficiency.63	  	  McNamara,	  former	  president	  of	  Ford	  Motor	  Company,	  saw	  little	  reason	  to	  consult	  a	  "special	  interest"	  like	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  in	  decision	  making	  and	  saw	  little	  to	  be	  gained	  from	  labor	  officials	  operating	  in	  his	  department	  at	  cross	  purposes	  with	  his	  efficiency-­‐driven	  efforts.	  The	  secretary	  flatly	  rejected	  George	  Meany's	  nomination	  of	  AFL-­‐CIO	  Vice	  President	  Joseph	  Keenan	  to	  be	  the	  assistant	  secretary	  of	  defense	  for	  manpower	  issues.64	  Throughout	  the	  Kennedy	  presidency,	  organized	  labor	  complained	  loudly,	  as	  they	  had	  during	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration,	  about	  lack	  of	  representation	  on	  key	  defense	  decision-­‐making	  bodies.65	  Without	  official	  representation	  in	  the	  Defense	  Department,	  labor	  could	  do	  virtually	  nothing	  to	  prevent	  McNamara	  from	  pursuing	  such	  policies	  as	  reversing	  the	  1933	  "Buy	  American"	  Act	  and	  opening	  up	  bidding	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  small	  naval	  vessels	  to	  foreign	  competition.66	  	  Given	  his	  almost	  singular	  focus	  on	  cost	  cutting	  and	  efficiency,	  McNamara	  had	  little	  patience	  with	  those	  who	  sought	  to	  use	  defense	  dollars	  to	  address	  problems	  such	  as	  chronic	  unemployment	  in	  distressed	  areas.	  In	  spite	  of	  his	  early	  endorsement	  of	  "Operation	  Booster,"	  McNamara	  later	  publicly	  disavowed	  any	  social	  role	  for	  defense	  spending.	  "We	  don't	  propose	  to	  turn	  the	  defense	  industry	  into	  a	  WPA.	  We	  are	  going	  to	  buy	  what	  we	  need	  and	  only	  what	  we	  need,"	  he	  explained.67	  In	  1964,	  McNamara	  turned	  down	  a	  proposal	  to	  revive	  "set-­‐aside	  programs"	  from	  their	  dormant	  state.	  AFL-­‐CIO	  economist	  Nate	  Goldfinger	  lamented	  that	  "there	  is	  apparently	  a	  feeling	  on	  
the	  part	  of	  McNamara	  that	  the	  defense	  program	  should	  not	  be	  called	  upon	  to	  cope	  with	  problems	  of	  the	  economy."68	  	  To	  those	  seeking	  limits	  on	  the	  military-­‐industry	  complex,	  McNamara	  was,	  at	  least	  momentarily,	  a	  hero.69	  In	  1964,	  McNamara	  claimed	  to	  have	  saved	  the	  nation	  $4.1	  billion	  dollars.70	  The	  secretary	  closed	  bases,	  streamlined	  operations,	  and	  reined	  in	  contractors.	  But	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  saw	  only	  job	  losses	  at	  a	  time	  when	  unemployment	  remained	  well	  above	  full	  employment	  levels	  due	  to	  automation,	  increasing	  foreign	  competition,	  and	  slow	  economic	  growth.	  George	  Meany	  worried	  about	  the	  8,500	  civilian	  jobs	  eliminated	  in	  1963	  due	  to	  base	  closings.71	  "Thousands	  of	  jobs	  are	  being	  wiped	  out	  by	  this	  cut	  in	  spending,"	  complained	  Goldfinger	  in	  1964.72	  In	  a	  speech	  at	  a	  DOD	  industry	  briefing,	  AFL-­‐CIO	  Secretary-­‐Treasurer	  William	  Schnitzler	  responded	  to	  McNamara	  by	  insisting	  that	  "[w]e	  in	  the	  labor	  movement	  don't	  want	  a	  new	  WPA	  whose	  first	  two	  initials	  stand,	  not	  for	  'Works	  Progress'	  but	  for	  'Weapons	  Production.'"	  Like	  McNamara,	  Schnitzler	  insisted	  that	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  was	  concerned	  about	  waste,	  but	  added:	  "we	  are	  against	  the	  kind	  of	  waste	  represented	  by	  unemployment	  and	  community	  bankruptcy.	  We	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  eliminating	  waste	  on	  one	  front	  ought	  to	  create	  waste	  on	  another."73	  	  	  Although	  military	  spending	  remained	  an	  enormous	  portion	  of	  the	  national	  economy	  during	  and	  after	  the	  McNamara	  era,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  military-­‐industrial	  complex	  changed	  significantly.	  With	  the	  shift	  to	  more	  stringent	  contract	  provisions,	  defense	  dollars	  no	  longer	  guaranteed	  profits.	  Between	  1965	  and	  1969,	  the	  profits	  of	  defense	  contractors	  Lockheed	  Aircraft,	  General	  Dynamics,	  and	  General	  Electric	  all	  fell	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  conflict.	  The	  effects	  of	  increasing	  inflation	  after	  1965	  made	  fixed-­‐price	  contracts	  an	  ever-­‐greater	  risk.74	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1960s,	  contracts	  granted	  to	  labor	  surplus	  areas	  could	  not	  insure	  the	  temporary	  economic	  relief	  on	  which	  more	  permanent	  recovery	  might	  be	  built.75	  	  Thus,	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  organized	  labor's	  hopes	  of	  reviving	  its	  defense	  spending	  agenda	  essentially	  came	  to	  naught.	  The	  war	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  introduced	  new	  complex	  dynamics	  into	  the	  equation.	  Philip	  Foner	  and	  others	  have	  linked	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO's	  "unstinting	  support"	  for	  the	  war	  to	  its	  desire	  to	  create	  jobs	  for	  its	  membership.76	  While	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO's	  anticommunism	  was	  grounded	  in	  an	  idealistic	  hatred	  for	  communism	  separate	  from	  economic	  issues,	  the	  logic	  of	  military	  Keynesian	  certainly	  undergirded	  the	  labor	  federation's	  calls	  for	  a	  hardline	  on	  Cold	  War	  issues.	  Organized	  labor	  deeply	  believed	  that	  the	  American	  economy	  could	  thrive	  producing	  both	  guns	  and	  butter—preferably	  with	  the	  guns	  produced	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  promote	  a	  plentiful	  and	  equal	  distribution	  of	  butter.	  But	  the	  McNamara-­‐controlled	  defense	  establishment	  hardly	  offered	  an	  ideal	  atmosphere	  in	  which	  to	  pursue	  such	  an	  eventuality.	  	  
Conclusion	  	  In	  the	  end,	  an	  effort	  to	  assert	  greater	  civilian	  control	  over	  military	  spending	  undermined	  organized	  labor's	  agenda	  for	  the	  military-­‐	  industrial	  complex—an	  
agenda	  it	  managed	  to	  implement	  only	  piecemeal	  and	  temporarily.	  Trade	  union	  leaders	  hoped	  to	  harness	  military	  Keynesianism—as	  one	  might	  Social	  Keynesianism—to	  counterweight	  the	  harsh	  effects	  of	  the	  market-­‐driven	  capitalistic	  economy—to	  make	  the	  state	  a	  broker	  and	  equalizer	  responsive	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  weak	  elements	  of	  society.	  Hardly	  a	  "lackey	  of	  militarism,"	  as	  some	  have	  charged,	  labor	  showed	  an	  innovative	  persistence	  in	  trying	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  its	  membership—even	  if	  it	  meant	  embracing	  military	  Keynesianism.77	  	  That	  trade	  unionists	  enjoyed	  any	  success	  at	  all	  suggests	  the	  military-­‐industrial	  complex	  emerged	  the	  product	  of	  a	  pluralistic	  democratic	  system.	  It	  served	  many	  masters	  and	  its	  character	  ultimately	  was	  determined	  by	  compromises	  between	  competing	  visions.	  Hardly	  a	  garrison	  state	  departure	  from	  American	  tradition,	  the	  military-­‐	  industrial	  complex,	  although	  large	  in	  scale,	  fits	  comfortably	  within	  the	  twentieth-­‐century	  model	  of	  American	  governance—in	  which	  multiple	  influences	  compete,	  shaping	  eventual	  outcome.	  Like	  all	  parties	  vying	  for	  influence,	  labor	  enjoyed	  some	  successes	  and	  suffered	  setbacks.	  No	  single	  vision	  dominated	  the	  outcome,	  and	  the	  process	  often	  appeared	  chaotic.	  But	  that	  the	  military-­‐industrial	  complex	  allowed	  organized	  labor	  the	  space	  to	  lobby	  for	  and	  implement	  some	  programs	  that	  helped	  some	  people	  is	  undeniable.	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  Project	  Value	  program	  trained	  and	  employed	  only	  Native	  American	  youth.	  The	  program	  appears	  to	  have	  died	  with	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Johnson	  administration.	  	  76.	  Foner,	  American	  Labor	  and	  the	  Indochinese	  War,	  20-­‐22.	  Foner	  argues,	  "Guns	  brought	  butter	  to	  many	  hitherto	  unemployed	  or	  underemployed	  and	  lulled	  them	  into	  support	  of,	  or	  at	  least	  indifference	  to	  the	  war."	  	  77.	  Rice's	  "lackey"	  comment	  as	  quoted	  by	  Ellen	  Schrecker,	  "The	  Legacy	  of	  Charles	  Owen	  Rice,"	  66.	  	  
